Proposition Definition En Francais
2°. Another type of frivolous sentences is when part of the complex idea is claimed from the name of the set, or what is the same when one confirms part of a definition of the definite word. These are all propositions where the sex of the species is confirmed and where more general concepts are confirmed by terms that are less. For what instruction, what knowledge produces this sentence, lead is a metal, in the mind of a man who knows the complex idea designated by the word lead? It is quite true that with regard to a man who knows the meaning of the word metal and not that of the word lead, it is shorter to explain to him the meaning of the word lead and to tell him that it is a metal (which denotes at once several of his simple ideas) than to count them individually. by telling him that it is a very heavy, melting and malleable body. Here we can deal with the question of whether it is always necessary that, in these sentences, the positive of the comparison should suit both members of the comparison: and whether, for example, it is necessary to assume that two things are good in order to be able to say that one is better than the other. On the contrary, it is an extension of the idea; for the negative sentence separates from the subject the idea of the attribute in all its extent; And the reason is clear; For to be the subject of an idea and to be included in its extension is nothing other than to embrace this idea: and so, when we say that one idea does not enclose another, we say that it is not one of the subjects of this idea. Therefore, when I say that man is not an insensitive being, I mean that he is not one of the unsentient beings; And that`s why I separate them all from him. Hence this axiom: the attribute of a negative sentence is always taken universally. The attribute is not complex if the subject`s relation to the mode of being is expressed in a single word, either this word simultaneously expresses the intellectual existence of the subject, or this existence is stated separately. Therefore, if one says, I read, I am attentive, then the characteristics of these two sentences are not complex, because in each expresses in one word the relationship of the subject to the way in which it is attributed to him; Read establishes this relationship and the existence of the subject, and it is synonymous with being read; Attentive indicates only the subject`s suitability relationship to the attribute.
The veracity of such sentences depends on the truth of the two parties and the separation they contain; for if both parties were true, such a suggestion would be ridiculous if there were no opposition between them, as if I were saying: Judas was a thief, and yet he cannot tolerate Magdelaine distributing his perfumes on J.C. As for the manner in which the proposal should be made, Horace contented himself with prescribing modesty and simplicity. He doesn`t want us to promise miracles first or bring up big ideas in the reader`s mind about what we`re going to tell him. “Beware,” he said, “that you should begin as a bad poet once did. I will sing the happiness of Priam, and this war is famous: proposition, (logic) the phrase is the faithful interpreter of judgment; Or rather, the sentence is nothing more than the judgment itself, revealed by expressions. In each proposal, there must necessarily be a subject and an attribute, or explicitly stated or at least implicit; Because there is no discourse without a subject to address and without quality to address. This subject is always indicated in analogue languages by a word intended for this service and differs from what the attribute indicates: instead of the fact that in transpositive languages one and the same word fulfills these two functions, if the subject is to be expressed by one of the three personal pronouns; The genius of these languages revealed that the verb used to attribute a thing to the subject would make the person known by its end and would then be sufficient to indicate the subject and attribution. Thus, Latin says in one word what Francis says in two words: ambulate, time, odimus; It works, you fear it, we hate it.
According to this method, one can make unequivocal demonstrations and statements in words without making the slightest progress in the knowledge of the truth of things. Everyone can see an infinity of such phrases, arguments, and conclusions in books of metaphysics, scholastic theology, and a certain type of physics, the reading of which will teach him no more about God, mind, and body than he knows before reading these books. See the article Truth. It seems to me that grammar in relation to the subject of the sentence can do without the consideration of other types. He must know the terms and compound sentences, because syntax affects the numerical inflections of words, and the use of conjunctions without this key can be inexplicable, see Word, loc. cit. He must know complex terms and sentences, as he must indicate and characterize the relationship of random sentences and determine the construction of logical and grammatical parts that otherwise cannot be recognized. But what could grammar gain if it took into account modal, conditional, causal, relative, discrediting, exclusive, exceptional, comparative, receptive, desitive sentences? Whether these different aspects can provide Logic with the means to discuss the truth of the fund at the right time; They may be useless in grammar, and she must give them up. Here, of course, the question arises as to whether there can be untruths, not in simple ideas, but in complex terms that form random sentences. There is no doubt about that, because it is enough that there is an explicit or virtual judgment and confirmation.
That`s what we always encounter. This is what we will see best if we look specifically at the two types of complex concepts; One that is explanatory and the other that is decisive. 2°. All sentences in which two abstract concepts are confirmed from each other concern only the meaning of sounds; For no abstract idea can be equal to anything other than itself, if its abstract name of another abstract concept is confirmed, it cannot mean anything other than that idea can or must be called by that name, or that these two names mean the same idea.